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Review Articles
Evolving Thought
Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the
Evolution of Culture and Cognition
by Merlin Donald, 1991,
Cambridge MA & London: Harvard University
Press, 413pp.
Mark Lake
This book is a brave attempt to rectify what the author
identifies as a major problem in contemporary cogn-
itive science - the failure to produce broad integrative
theories capable of giving direction to the field. Since
a lack of bold theorizing also characterizes the archae-
ology of human origins, Donald's work should be of
as much interest to palaeoanthropologists and arch-
aeologists as to cognitive scientists.
Two aspects of Donald's analysis are partic-
ularly stimulating. The first is the use of a theoretical
framework capable of incorporating biological and
technological factors in a single evolutionary
continuum. The second is his specific thesis about
the evolution of the modern mind which includes a
model of the cognitive abilities of Homo erectus.
Donald is not an archaeologist, and his treatment of
the archaeological record is sometimes inadequate.
Nevertheless, he has thrown down the gauntlet. In
the absence of an alternative model for the origin of
the modern mind, disputes over 'fact' will carry little
weight, and Donald's will be a hard act to follow.
Donald's aim is to derive a model of higher
cognitive structure that is compatible with available
neurological evidence and plausible given convent-
ional evolutionary constraints. The author begins by
outlining the dichotomous nature of approaches to
the problem of mind and the difficulties which they
entail. On the one hand there are modular approaches
which postulate specific modules for different
cognitive abilities. These have tended to be non-
evolutionary, and have given rise to structural models
which may not be plausible when viewed from an
evolutionary perspective. Unitary models, on the
other hand, attribute the power of the modern mind
to a general learning capacity made possible by
encephalization (the expansion of the cerebral cortex),
and thus require a less complex evolutionary scenario;
the notion of a general learning capacity, however, is
not supported by neuropsychological evidence.
Donald sets out to bridge the divide between
these two models by offering a structural proposal
with a corresponding evolutionary thesis. He focuses
first on cognitive architecture: changes in this may be
facilitated by altered neuroanatomy, the functional
rearrangement of existing neural resources, or
external technological developments. Next he
emphasizes the need for an interdisciplinary approach
in the spirit of Darwin, stressing that there is no
reason to suppose a priori that mind lies outside the
realm of the natural sciences. He then moves on to
address the issue of cognitive stages, arguing here
that each major phase in the evolution of the modern
mind has involved a new mode of representation,
but that at each stage the earlier modes have remained
intact.
The second half of the book develops Donald's
specific thesis. He argues that there have been three
major transitions en route to the modern mind. Basic
primate cognition is characterized as episodic: our
closest living relatives are capable of sophisticated
event-perception (particularly in the social sphere)
but are incapable of abstraction. Their ability to use
but not spontaneously create symbols is the result of
a reliance upon situation-dependent 'memory
flashbacks'. The first transition, therefore, was from
the episodic culture of the apes and australopithecines
to the mimetic culture of Homo erectus. According to
Donald, Homo erectus was able to represent any event
with the deliberate intent to communicate; an ability
founded on a combination of primate event-
perception and an extended conscious map of the
body. In many respects this is the most exciting part
of the book. Donald's method is revealed clearly in
his account of a cognitive ability which is no longer
the principal level of operation for any extant species.
The second transition coincided with the
appearance of Homo sapiens and involved the switch
from mimetic to mythic culture. The crucial element
in mythic culture is the ability to construct conceptual
models; this is intricately bound up with language,
whose initial function was not communication but a
means to facilitate the formalization and unification
of thought.
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The final - and perhaps unfinished - transition
was to a cognitive architecture which involves exter-
nal symbolic storage. Here material symbols provide
an extension to biological memory, one which
frequently outlasts the lives of individuals, and which
leads the author to argue that the 'individual mind
has long since ceased to be definable in a meaningful
way within its confining biological membrane.'
It is Donald's choice of cognition as the principal
level of analysis which facilitates his multidisciplinary
approach and which renders his work of considerable
interest to archaeologists. He rightly regards cognition
as the mediator between biology and culture, and in
so doing he assigns Palaeolithic archaeology a crucial
role in the wider debate about human origins, since
it is only through archaeology that we can examine
the cognitive abilities of specific hominids. If cognitive
architecture is not determined solely by neural
anatomy then major changes in cognition may not be
manifest in the fossil record in the form of altered
cranial morphology. Similarly, vestiges in the modern
mind may provide evidence for past cognitive
abilities, but since they contain no intrinsic inform-
ation about the timing of change they are incapable
of supporting an evolutionary thesis. The fact that
Origins of the Modern Mind makes considerably more
use of the evidence available from the study of neural
pathologies than that from archaeology may explain
why Donald's evolutionary thesis is weaker than his
structural proposal - a problem to which I return
below.
If this account places archaeology in its proper
place in the study of human evolution it also provides
the basis of a framework capable of transcending
current divisions within the discipline. There is a
growing awareness amongst specialists of later
prehistory that material culture does not reflect
thought in a passive manner but also plays an active
role in structuring it, although attention has been
focused on specific meanings rather than on the
structure of thought itself. Students of earlier
prehistory, by contrast, regard material culture
primarily as a means of adaptation; it has a complex
feedback with evolutionary processes but is limited
in its scope by the cognitive capacities of its creators.
Both approaches are partial: the former lacks an
evolutionary perspective capable of dealing with
long-term change while the latter denies material
culture an evolutionary dynamic of its own, regarding
it as a 'tool' used to solve problems which are indep-
endently caused and perceived. By concentrating on
cognitive architecture Donald has overcome these
limitations: the power and scope of cognition can be
attributed either to biological change or to the
possibilities afforded by material culture as an
external memory system. Thus material culture is
given a creative role within an evolutionary pers-
pective, and the resulting framework is appropriate
for all periods from the Lower Palaeolithic to the
present day.
Donald's theoretical framework has much to
offer archaeology, but his treatment of archaeological
data is less sophisticated than his use of data derived
from the cognitive sciences. Given the vital role of
archaeology in examining the timing and context of
hominid evolution it is no coincidence that his evolut-
ionary thesis is weaker than his structural proposal.
In chapter 6, which most clearly demonstrates his
method, Donald argues that Homo erectus possessed
a mimetic culture in which the highest level of
processing was the modelling of perceptual events in
self-initiated motor acts. His argument has three
strands: first, that the evolutionary starting point is
the episodic culture of the apes; second, that even
without language the modern human mind is
superior to that of apes; and third, that the cognition
of Homo erectus must serve as a basis for the later
arrival of language. Having used evidence from
clinical psychology to identify a mimetic phase in
human cognitive evolution, Donald turns to the
archaeological evidence to demonstrate that this
phase coincides with Homo erectus rather than Homo
habilis or archaic Homo sapiens. If the selective press-
ures that gave rise to a capacity for mimetic culture
are to be identified, it is essential to know something
about the anatomy, environment and activities of the
hominid which developed that capacity.
Regrettably, Donald's use of archaeological
sources is inadequate. Many of his assertions about
the archaeological record are not referenced (unlike
his cognitive science) and of the few works cited
most are dated and/or simplistic. In outlining the
difference between the abilities of the earlier hominids
(the australopithecines and Homo habilis) and Homo
erectus Donald makes a number of claims which are
problematic: first, that the earlier species remained in
an essentially ape environment; second, that their
tool-making ability was absent or minimal; and third,
that they had a relatively modern social organization
which may have involved home-base behaviour. In
contrast, Homo erectus successfully colonized a range
of new habitats, and Acheulean artefacts provide
'extensive and solid' evidence for increased tool
manufacture. Donald is right that the fossil evidence
for early hominids is confined to sub-Saharan Africa,
but such a gross level of resolution is inadequate for
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discussion of evolutionary processes. Having 'come
down from the trees', early hominids occupied a very
different microhabitat from that of their closest
primate relations. This does not alter the fact that
erectus inhabited a wider range of environments, but
it does indicate the need to be clear about what are
the important dimensions of variability. The patchy
resource structure of a mosaic savanna environment
may have required greater cognitive abilities on the
part of the australopithecines and Homo habilis than
Donald suggests. Similarly his treatment of early
hominid tool behaviour is surprisingly simplistic. He
argues that Oldowan tools may not have been
manufactured, but instead that 'found tools could
have been collected, perhaps slightly refined by
striking against a harder surface, and left behind in
one place after use.' Viewed as imposition of form,
Oldowan artefacts are less complex than those of the
Acheulean, but it is not at all clear that the context of
tool manufacture was significantly different. Spatial
aspects of Oldowan tool-use may have been just as
developed, involving the transport of raw materials
and perhaps the curation of finished tools. Finally,
although the social organization of the earliest
hominids is an extremely contentious issue, it is
probably fair to say that the degree of co-operation
postulated by Lovejoy (whom Donald cites) no longer
finds widespread support in the literature.
These weaknesses in Donald's use of arch-
aeological data undermine his evolutionary thesis.
Episodic culture permits a considerable amount of
social interaction, sufficient according to Donald to
overcome the increased risk of inhabiting a more
open environment without any significant technol-
ogical advances - hence the minimal tool-making
but increased co-operation supposedly evident in the
australopithecines and Homo habilis. Archaeological
evidence, however, suggests that the ability of habilis
to inhabit a mosaic savanna envir-onment may also
have depended on technological advance, not in terms
of highly-developed tool forms but rather in the
spatial organization of tool manufacture and use. In
the realm of technology these early hominids were
capable of a degree of anticipation and curation which
Donald associates with the mimetic culture of Homo
erectus. The greater refinement of the tools made by
erectus does not provide evidence for more advanced
instrumental technology; rather it reflects the
improvement wrought by mimetic culture in the
transmission of skills. In functional terms, Acheulean
tools confer relatively little advantage over their
Oldowan predecessors, so it is difficult to construct
an argument for the selective advantage of 'improved'
tool manufacture. It may be that the increased
complexity of Acheulean tools provided an important
vehicle for acculturation rather than an improved
means of interacting with the physical environment.
This might explain the prolonged association of
Oldowan tools with Homo erectus in the Far East: a
wooded environment similar to the ancestral ape
environment permitted smaller group-sizes which did
not require formal channels for socialization. A social
role for the increased sophistication of Acheulean
tools would also explain why they show practically
no variability across widely differing environments.
Thus mimetic culture does not exhibit the one-to-one
mapping with Homo erectus that Donald suggests.
Some of the more general integrative skills may
already have been present in certain of the earlier
hominids (Donald's conflation of Australopithecus
africanus, Australo-pithecus robustus and Australop-
ithecus boisei is potentially dangerous in this respect),
while the more localized 'support modules' appear
to have come into their own with Homo erectus.
It would be foolish to suggest that the above in
any sense refutes Donald's thesis. It does indicate,
however, that his model remains vague in establishing
the selective pressures which gave rise to mimetic
culture. A more detailed treatment of the archaeol-
ogical record would make his argument more
convincing.
Similar criticisms could be applied to Donald's
use of archaeology in documenting the transitions
from mimetic to mythic culture and from mythic
culture to external symbolic storage, but here again
Origins of the Modern Mind contains tantalizing
glimpses of the way forward. He discusses the work
of Plotkin and colleagues, who propose that the
process of evolution occurs at different levels each
sensitive to events of different frequency. Donald
then makes the highly significant observation that
over the course of hominid evolution there has been
a decrease in the breadth of adaptive radiation, i.e.
there have been fewer and fewer competing hominid
subspecies. Finally, he argues that mythic culture
facilitates the piecing together of a large number of
episodes so as to give a place and meaning to smaller-
scale events. These three ideas point to the significance
of perception: as the modern mind evolved, it was
able to perceive events occurring over increasing (and
decreasing) temporal and spatial scales. The number
of coexisting subspecies may have decreased because
the capacity for event perception at new scales
effectively broadened the hominid niche. Since event-
perception is a function of cognitive architecture, the
challenge facing archaeologists aiming to document
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cognitive evolution is to determine the scale of perc-
eption operative at different points in hominid
evolution. The evidence available includes the spatial
organization of stone tool technology, rates of change
of tool morphology (which will reflect the degree
and type of social interaction), and the scheduling of
resource exploitation.
Origins of the Modern Mind should prove
inspirational, both for those specifically interested in
hominid evolution and for those who want to
understand the role played by material culture in the
human career. Donald has developed a model of
hominid cognition which is bolder and more inclusive
than anything yet attempted by archaeologists. His
treatment of aspects of the archaeological record may
lack sophistication, but its broad scope largely
outweighs the individual failings. He has challenged
archaeologists to put their work in its proper context
and make a contribution to the wider debate about
what it is to be human - and how we came to be that
way.
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